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In a country such as China, with abundant consumer products and the inevitability
of product defects, claims for punitive damages are sure to arise under Article 47 of the
new Chinese Tort Law. Article 47 provides that “(w)hereany producer or seller
knowingly produces or sells defective products, causing death or serious damage to the
health of others, the injured party may request appropriate punitive damages.” As
Chinese jurists and scholars interpret Article 47, they may wish to consider whether
lessons can be drawn from the American experience. During the past two decades, few
areas of American law have changed more radically than the law on punitive damages.
While there were once few restraints on the ability of a judge or jury to impose punitive
damages in a case involving egregious conduct, today there are a host of limitations
embodied in American state and federal law. In many American states, statutes or
judicial decisions restrict the ability of a court to award punitive damages by narrowly
defining the types of conduct that will justify a punitive award, raising the standard of
proof, capping the amount of punitive damages, requiring a portion of a punitive award
to be forfeited to the state, or limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages. In
addition, under federal constitutional law, the principle of due process limits the
imposition of punitive damages by scrutinizing the ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages and prohibiting an award to be based on harm to persons other than
the plaintiff. An examination of these developments from a comparative law perspective
may prove useful to the implementation of Article 47.
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INTRODUCTION
The Chinese Tort Law, 1 which became effective in 2010, 2 allows for punitive
damages to be awarded in a narrow range of cases. Specifically, Article 47 provides that
“(w) here any producer or seller knowingly produces or sells defective products, causing
death or serious damage to the health of others, the injured party may request appropriate
punitive damages.”3 This law is the first legislation in China “specifically to use the term
‘punitive damages.”4
1

See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qinquan Zerenfa (Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China)
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. National People’s Congress, Dec. 26, 2009, effective Jul. 1, 2010)
(Lawinfochina), available at 2009 China Law LEXIS 668.
2
Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort Law, 34 THOMAS JEFFERSON L.
REV. 43, 80–1 (2011) (“In 2009, after many years of study and deliberation, China adopted a new
comprehensive tort law…, which became effective July 1, 2010”).
3
See Chinese Tort Law, fn.1, Article 47.
4
Jordan Brandt et. al., China, 45 INT’L LAW. 487, 490 (2011).
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A. China’s Alignment with Common Law Countries
In recognizing that the imposition of punitive damages is sometimes appropriate in
tort litigation, China has joined the relatively small number of countries that have
embraced a similar position. That group notably includes the United States5 and other
common law countries such as England, 6 Wales, 7 Ireland, 8 Northern Ireland, 9
Australia,10 New Zealand,11 and Canada,12 as well as Zimbabwe.13 However, among the
countries allowing punitive damages, there is “little consensus on the factors used to
determine the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded.”14
In many parts of the world, recovery of punitive damages is not permitted in a tort
action and foreign judgments awarding punitive damages are not enforced.15 According
to some scholars, “virtually all civil law countries disallow punitive damages in tort
cases.” 16 European civil law countries, in particular, “remain impervious to this
Americanization … (and) the concept of punitive damages is still nonexistent.”17 Thus,

5

Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 410 (2009) (discussing the history of punitive
damages in the United States).
6
Sir Henry Brooke, A Brief Introduction: The Origin of Punitive Damages, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES 1, 1 (Helmut Koziol & Vanessa Wilcox eds., 2009) (“exemplary
damages first made their appearance…in England in the 1760s…and over the next 200 years…were awarded
from time to time not only in cases of assault, false imprisonment, defamation, seduction and malicious
prosecution, but also in cases of trespass to land, and eventually trespass to goods”); see also Vanessa Wilcox,
id. at 7, 53 (predicting that “‘exemplary’ damages will remain a part of English law for a while to come”).
7
See Brooke, fn.6 at 1 (discussing Wales); Thomas Rouhette, The Availability of Punitive Damages in
Europe: Growing Trend or Nonexistent Concept?, 74 DEFENSE COUNSEL J. 320, 327 (2007) (indicating that
punitive damages are “strictly limited in England and Wales”).
8
See Brooke, fn.6 at 2 (discussing Ireland).
9
See Id. at 2 (discussing Northern Ireland).
10
See Id. (discussing Australia).
11
See Id. (discussing New Zealand).
12
See Id. (discussing Canada).
13
Geoffrey Feltoe, Zimbabwe, in R. Blanpain, ed. INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS at 115 (2002)
(“Punitive damages are used sparingly in Zimbabwe”).
14
John Y. Gotanda, Punitive Damages: A Comparative Analysis, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 391,
394–5 (2004) (finding that punitive damages are “widely available” in England, Australia, New Zealand, the
United States, and Canada).
15

John Y. Gotanda, Charting Developments Concerning Punitive Damages: Is the Tide Changing?, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 528 (2007) (“American parties should not anticipate smooth sailing when
seeking to have a domestic punitive damages award recognized and enforced in other countries….(T)here still
are significant hurdles that may bar enforcement”).
16
Julia A. Davies & Paul T. Hayden, GLOBAL ISSUES IN TORT LAW 12 (2008).
17
See Rouhette, fn.7 at 342.
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punitive damages are generally not available in Austria,18 France,19 Germany,20 Italy,21
Hungary,22 Scandinavia,23 or Scotland24 (the latter of which has a mixed legal system
derived from civil law and common law influences), nor in Mexico, 25 Brazil, 26 or
Japan.27

18

Willibald Posch, Austria, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS 138 (R. Blanpain, ed. 2002).

19

See Jean-Sebastien Borghetti, Punitive Damages in France, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND
CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, fn.6 at 55, 56 (“Although punitive damages do not officially exist as such under
French law, some mechanisms do exist which bear some resemblance to them”); See also Matthew Parker,
Changing Tides: The Introduction of Punitive Damages into the French Legal System, 41 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 389, 390 (2013) (discussing a 2010 case in which the French Court of Cassation refused to enforce
California court’s judgment which included a punitive damages award, but stated that “an award of punitive
damages is not per se contrary to public policy”).
20

See Nils Jansen and Lukas Rademacher, Punitive Damages in Germany, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, fn.6, at 75, 76 (“the widely prevailing opinion sees no place for
punitive damages under German law”); Id. at 86 (“apart from the exception of damages for discrimination,
there are no punitive damages in German law”); ANDREW J. MCCLURG, ADEM KOYUNCU, & LUIS EDUARDO
SPROVIERI, Practical Global Tort Litigation: United States, Germany and Argentina, Carolina Academic Press
(Durham), at 207 (2007) (“In Germany, punitive damages are viewed as a quirky phenomenon of U.S. tort
law”).
21

Alessandro P. Scarso, Punitive Damages in Italy, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES, at 103, 113 (“As a general rule, Italian (tort) law does not award punitive damages”).
22

Attila Menyhard, Punitive Damages in Hungary, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES, at 87 (“Punitive damages as such are not recognized in Hungarian tort law: neither on a
regulatory level nor in court practice”).
23

Bjarte Askeland, Punitive Damages in Scandinavia, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
PERSPECTIVES, at 115, 115 (“‘punitive damages’…simply have no tradition under Scandinavian law”).
24

See Brooke, fn.6 at 2 (indicating that exemplary damages have “never formed part of the law of
Scotland”).
25

See INTERNATIONAL PERSONAL INJURY COMPENSATION 438 (Dennis Campbell, ed., 1996) (“Mexican
law does not contemplate or regulate…punitive damages. An exception to this is moral damage which, in a
limited scope incorporates concepts of…punitive damages”); but see Jorge A. Vargas, Moral Damages Under
the Civil Law of Mexico: Are These Damages Equivalent to U.S. Punitive Damages?, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 183, 267 (2004) (indicating that some “American judges…have made determinations that Mexico’s
‘moral damages’ are equivalent to punitive damages, exemplary damages, or loss of consortium”).
26

See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION 4
(2011) (“Technically, punitive damages are not allowed….Legal scholars…cannot agree on whether moral
damages are the equivalent of U.S. punitive damages”).
27

See Norman T. Braslow, The Recognition and Enforcement of Common Law Punitive Damages in a
Civil Law System: Some Reflections on the Japanese Experience, 16 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 285, 358
(1999) (“Germany and Japan have judicially determined that the punitive damage portions of American
judgments will not be recognized, and given the intense scrutiny of these cases by both academics and the
courts, it is highly unlikely these decisions will be reconsidered”).
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Discussing Europe, Sir Henry Brooke observed that “an important part of the
continental temperament is to distrust punitive damages.”28 Focusing on the European
Union in particular, Professor Bernhard A. Koch indicates that “(d)espite constant rumors
to the contrary, punitive damages do not seem to be of any significance in EU law yet.”29
China’s recognition of punitive damages was momentous. As described by one
author:
(Article 1 of the Chinese Tort Law) states, “In order to protect the legitimate rights and
interests of parties in civil relationships, clarify the tort liability, prevent and punish
tortious conduct, and promote the social harmony and stability, this Law is formulated.”
Although China has followed the continental European civil law approach in the
development of its laws, the “punish” language in the (Chinese Tort Law) is a grand
departure from one of the core principles of continental European civil tort law, where the
purpose of tort law is to compensate a victim for his loss and to prevent future harm, but
not to punish the violation.30

B. Article 47’s Uncertain Future
Scholars have speculated that the inclusion in the Chinese Tort Law of a punitive
damages rule linked to products liability is “a response to recent scandals that have
caused an abundance of worldwide recalls of Chinese products.” 31 On this theory,
presumably it was necessary to enhance the wide range of other penalties under Chinese

28

See Brooke, fn.6, at 3; see also Michael L. Wells, A Common Lawyer’s Perspective on the European
Perspective on Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. REV. 557, 557 (2010) (“While punitive damages are
well-entrenched in the common law legal systems of the United States and Great Britain, they have a far
smaller role in the civil law tradition of Continental Europe”).
29

See Bernhard A. Koch, Punitive Damages in European Law, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW AND
CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, fn.6 at 197, 208; but see Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages — A European
Perspective, 68 LA. L. REV. 741, 749 (2008) (“An inclination towards punitive damages exists in some [EU]
directives; for example, on consumer credit and in the area of anti-discrimination in the workplace”).
30

See Jason E. Kelley, Seeking Justice for Pollution Victims in China: Why China Should Amend the Tort
Liability Law to Allow Punitive Damages in Environmental Tort Cases, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 529
(2012), citing Helmut Koziol & ZHU Yan, Background and Key Contents of the New Chinese Tort Liability
Law, 1 J. EUR. TORT L. 328, 336 (2010).
31

Tina M. Castellana, Unconventional Remedies: The Feasibility of a Private Recall Remedy in the
People’s Republic of China, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 233, 242 (2011); see generally LIU Chenglin The
Obstacles of Outsourcing Imported Food Safety to China, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 249, 251 (2010) (discussing
the recall of melamine tainted pet foods imported from China and related legal issues); LIU Chenglin, Profits
Above the Law: China’s Melamine Tainted Milk Incident, 79 MISS. L.J. 371, 373 (2009) (hereinafter “Tainted
Milk Incident”) (discussing a food safety scandal that “prompted a number of Asian countries and the
European Union to ban food products from China”).
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law that already discourage the marketing of dangerous products.32
Thus far, despite the authorization of Article 47, punitive damages have never been
awarded by a Chinese court.33 Consequently, there is no well-established right to punitive
damages in China.34 And, except as noted below, punitive damages are not available in a
Chinese tort action.35
In a country such as China with abundant consumer products and the inevitability of
product defects, claims for punitive damages are sure to arise under Article 47. Scholars
have also argued that China should allow recovery of punitive damages in other contexts,
such as harm arising from environmental torts.36 As Chinese jurists and scholars interpret
32

As Professor Chenglin Liu explains:
The criminal law of China imposes severe sanctions on those who produce counterfeit or
substandard products that cause serious bodily injury or death.
Product safety in China is regulated by China’s Product Quality Law, which requires sellers to
inspect and verify the quality of products and prohibits the production or sale of products that fail to
meet that standard. The consequences for producing adulterated products range from halt of
production to confiscation to fines equaling up to 300% of the total sale. Under the most serious
circumstances, the penalty may include revocation of the producer’s business license and even
criminal investigation. If . . . fake drugs cause serious harm or death, the responsible parties will face
penalties ranging from three years to life imprisonment. If the circumstances are particularly serious,
the death penalty may be imposed. In either case, responsible parties will face a fine of 50% to 200%
of the sale amount or a confiscation of the total amount of the illegal proceeds.
In terms of compensation, the producer of a defective product may be liable for medical expenses as
well as any lost earnings as a result of the injury. Compensation may also cover the living expenses of a
party’s dependants if the defective product left the victim disabled. In cases that result in the victim’s
death, the law entitles the decedent’s surviving dependants to funeral and living expenses.
LIU Chenglin, Leaving the FDA Behind: Pharmaceutical Outsourcing and Drug Safety, 48 TEX. INT’L L.J.
1, 20–1 (2012).
33
See Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort Law, 34 THOMAS JEFFERSON
L. REV. 43, 87 (2011) (“Americans might argue that a tort system like the one in China — where contingent
fees are (strictly speaking) prohibited, where there are no provisions for aggregate litigation (e.g. class actions),
where punitive damages have never been awarded, and where there is no independent judiciary — provides
little hope of affording the victims of accidents access to legal remedies for the injuries they suffer”).
34
Cf. Andrea Conzatti, The Recognition of U.S. “Opt-Out” Class Actions in China, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L.
641, 668 (2013) [“certain awards approved by U.S. courts (more specifically, a ‘punitive damages award’)
would unlikely be granted preclusive effects in China, given the absence — within the PRC’s legal system —
of an equivalent legal concept”].
35
Brian J. Safran, A Critical Look at Western Perceptions of China’s Intellectual Property System, 3 U.
PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 135, 175 (2012) (discussing the products liability exception).
36
Michael I. Jeffery QC & ZHAO Xiaobo, Developing A National Contaminated Land Liability Scheme
in China: The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act Revisited, 30 J.
ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 423, 465 n.171 (2012) (“The establishment of a punitive remedy has been
discussed by scholars for years”); See Kelley, fn.30 at 532 (“Punitive damages will not only provide a remedy
for victims of environmental pollution torts but will also punish and deter polluters, thus having a net positive
benefit on public health and the environment”); See also REN Xiang, Judicial Cases in China in 2012, 1
CHINESE J. COMP. L. 408, 419 (2013) (discussing the Xinyi Zijin case which arose from the collapse of a dam
at a tin mine and ultimately resulted in 243 million RMB settlement with the principal defendant).
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the punitive damages provision of the Chinese Tort Law and consider whether punitive
damages should be recognized in other fields, they may wish to consider whether lessons
can be drawn from the American experience. As Professor Ellen Bublick has written,
“(w)hether China’s tort law actually embodies the broad protections that appear on the
face of the Tort Liability Law depends in large part on its implementation through legal
institutions and procedures.”37
I. OVERVIEW OF REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Recent Restrictions on Punitive Damages
During the past two decades, few areas of American law have changed more radically
than the law on punitive damages. While there were once few restraints on the ability of a
judge or jury to impose punitive damages in a case involving egregious conduct,38 today
there are a host of limitations embodied in American state and federal law, such as
procedural rules which separate inquiries into the appropriateness of a punitive award
from the basic issue of whether the defendant should be liable for compensatory
damages.39 As a result, it is considerably more difficult than it once was for American
litigants to win at the trial level, and uphold on appeal, awards of punitive damages.40
The reformulation of the American law on punitive damages was motivated by the
fact that the once-vague principles governing such awards posed a risk that punitive
37

Ellen M. Bublick, China’s New Tort Law: The Promise of Reasonable Care, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y
J. 36, 42 (2011); See also Vincent R. Johnson, Train Wreck Serves as a Test for Chinese Law, HOUS. CHRON.,
Aug. 7, 2011, http://www.chron.com/opinion/outlook/article/Train-wreck-serves-as-a-test-for-Chinese-law2081496.php (discussing the limitations of a Chinese legal system in the context of a mass tort accident).
38
See e.g. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 6 n.1 (1991) (upholding against a
constitutional challenge an award of punitive damages that was levied after the jury was told little more than
that “you must take into account the character and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and
necessity of preventing similar wrong”).
39
A two-step litigation process which deals first with compensatory damages liability and second with
punitive damages liability is called a “bifurcated trial.” See e.g. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d) (Westlaw 2013)
(“The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that defendant’s
profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for plaintiff awarding actual
damages”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.13(b) (Westlaw 2013) (“In the first stage of a bifurcated trial, the trier
of fact shall determine liability for compensatory damages and the amount of compensatory damages or
nominal damages. Evidence relevant only to the issues of punitive damages shall not be admissible in this
stage”). The goal is to prevent issues related to the reprehensible nature of the defendant’s conduct or the
defendant’s wealth from contaminating the threshold inquiry into whether a tort has been committed.
Sometimes applicable law requires a “trifurcated” process where the second stage is whether punitive
damages should be imposed and the third stage is the amount of punitive damages.
40
See e.g. Patricia F. Miller, Comment, 2003 Texas House Bill 4: Unanimous Exemplary Damage Awards
and Texas Civil Jury Instructions, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 515, 518–9 (2006) (discussing comprehensive tort
reform legislation which was likely to create great obstacles for plaintiffs seeking punitive damages).
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damages would be levied against some defendants unpredictably and excessively.41 It
seems possible that the spare terminology of Article 47 of the Chinese Tort Law could
pose similar risks if Chinese courts begin to apply its provisions to the cases that come
before them.
B. Punishment and Deterrence
Under American tort law, punitive damages are intended, first and foremost, to punish
the defendant for reprehensible acts or omissions.42 This principle favoring punishment
of wrongdoers guides the applicable punitive damages rules in predictable ways, but also
informs the analysis of many less obvious questions.
Most American states do not permit recovery of the punitive damages if the tortfeasor
is dead.43 This is because, in such cases, it is impossible to punish the wrongdoer.
Similar concerns about punishment explain why some44 (but not all45) American
states hold that liability insurance cannot protect an insured from an award of punitive
damages. Those jurisdictions tend to reason that allowing a person to buy insurance
41

In what was then the largest verdict rendered by a U.S. court, the jury in a tortious interference action
awarded $3 billion in punitive damages in addition to a $7.53 billion compensatory damages award. See
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 784 (Tex. App. 1987).
42
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979) (indicating that punitive damages are “awarded
against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct”).
43
In Crabtree ex rel. Kemp v. Estate of Crabtree, 837 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 2005), the court wrote:
A minority of jurisdictions permit recovery of punitive damages after the tortfeasor’s death.
Although the decedent can be neither punished nor deterred, these courts have found punitive
damages sufficiently justified by deterrence of others from engaging in similar conduct….Some also
note that punitive damages provide additional compensation to victims for remote losses,
inconvenience, and attorney’s fees….
We believe the majority view is persuasive and hold that Indiana law does not permit recovery of
punitive damages from the estate of a deceased tortfeasor. The central purpose of punitive damages is
to punish the wrongdoer and to deter him from future misconduct, not to reward the plaintiff and not
to compensate the plaintiff….
Id. at 138–9. See also In re Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 2011) (denying recovery of punitive
damages in an action against an estate arising from the decedent’s unconsented removal of forty trees from a
neighbor’s property).
44
See, e.g. Peterson v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 642 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Cal. 1982) (noting that
insurance policies do not include coverage for punitive damages); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Hempstead, 397 N.E.2d 737, 744 (N.Y. 1979) (proscribing insurance coverage for punitive damages in certain
civil rights cases); See generally Ina Ebert, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, fn.6 at 213, 213 (“About half of all U.S.-states prohibit the
insurance of punitive damages for various reasons”).
45
See Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 948 A.2d 1285, 1293 n.3 (N.J. 2008)
[“(T)here has never been a declaration by this Court or the Legislature that punitive damages are
uninsurable…. Moreover, the Legislature has at least implicitly recognized that insurance of punitive
damages does not violate the public policy of this State”].
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against liability for punitive damages would enable a blameworthy actor to escape
liability by shifting such losses to other innocent insureds. Other purchasers of insurance,
even though they never engaged in reprehensible conduct, would eventually would pay
higher premiums if their insurance companies had to indemnify malefactors for
judgments imposing punitive damages.46
For related reasons, American courts carefully scrutinize punitive awards against
public entities, because the costs will usually be shouldered not by the actual tortfeasor,
but by the citizenry. For example, in Payne v. Jones,47 a case arising from abusive police
conduct, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a punitive damages
award of $300,000 was excessive, and that the case would be remanded for a new trial on
punitive damages unless the plaintiff agreed to accept only $100,000 in punitive damages.
In reducing the award, the court was mindful of the fact that, in such cases, it is often not
the wrongdoer but “the taxpaying public that bears the brunt of an excessive award.”48
Likewise, plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions normally are not permitted to recover
“lost” punitive damages — reimbursement for punitive damages awards that might have
been recovered in litigation but for the defendant lawyer’s negligence.49 As the Supreme
Court of California explained in Ferguson v. Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein,50
“[m]aking a negligent attorney liable for lost punitive damages would not serve a societal
interest, because the attorney did not commit and had no control over the intentional
misconduct justifying the punitive damages award.” 51
Punishment is not the only public policy that animates the law of punitive damages;
deterrence also plays a role. Sometimes called “exemplary damages,” punitive damages are
often intended to make an example of the defendant. Thus, from a public policy standpoint,
this type of award is intended to advance the interests of both specific deterrence52 (of the
tortfeasor whose reprehensible conduct is at issue) and general deterrence53 (of other

46

See Peterson v. Superior Court, 642 P.2d 1305, 1310 & n.4 (Cal. 1982) [discussing the rationale in
Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440–1 (5th Cir. 1962)].
47
711 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2013).
48
711 F.3d at 95.
49
See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 259–60 (2011) (discussing
damages).
50
135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Cal. 2003).
51
135 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
52
“In contrast with general deterrence, specific deterrence means to deter the individual who committed
the act from repeating it.” Dwayne C. Turner, Safer Laws?: Problematic Civil/Criminal Liability and Curbing
New York’s HIV/Aids Epidemic, 6 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 173, 189 (2003).
53
James Grimmelmann, Future Conduct and the Limits of Class-Action Settlements, 91 N.C. L. REV. 387,
422 (2013) (indicating that “general deterrence…aims to ensure that other potential defendants in similar
situations will take adequate precautions”).
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persons who might act in similarly egregious ways).54
C. An Important Tort Doctrine
Liability for punitive damages is an important part of American tort law, even if such
awards are not as common or as large as media reports might suggest.55 The relevant
legal principles are studied in American law schools56 and asserted by scholars and
litigators. The applicable substantive and procedural rules of punitive damages are
regarded as important. For example, it has been argued that “[a]ny diminution in the
exposure of legal services providers to punitive damages liability would undercut the
deterrent effect of the law in terms of discouraging abusive practices by other
providers.”57 However, even though punitive damages has been a viable concept in
American law since at least 1784,58 lawyers and judges now think much more carefully
and methodically about the appropriateness of punitive damages awards than once was
the case.
In the United States, punitive damages are available only under tort principles, not in
contract-based actions.59 In this respect, America seems to differ from China. In 2003,
“the Supreme People’s Court announced its interpretation on contract disputes involving
the sale of houses…and permitted buyers to potentially recover punitive damages from a

54

See In re Vajgrt, 801 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Iowa 2011) [“punitive or exemplary damages serve three
purposes: (1) punishment, (2) specific deterrence, and (3) general deterrence”]; see also GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing broadly the roles of specific and general deterrence in accident
law); Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect Minor Children, 51
VILLANOVA L. REV. 311, 325 (2006) (discussing the policy of preventing future harm and the difference
between specific deterrence and general deterrence).
55

See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for
Reform, 50 BUFFALO L. REV. 103, 161–65 (2002) (“Empirical studies of punitive damages in actual cases
have found that juries award punitive damages relatively infrequently. Studies conducted by researchers at the
RAND Corporation found that punitive damages are only awarded in 1%–8% of civil cases. Other studies
have found…similar rates”).
56

Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, On Race, Gender, and Radical Tort Reform, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
LAW 591, 593 n.20 (2011) [asserting that “intentional tort liability plays a prominent role in
(American)classroom coverage of many doctrines not specifically focused on intentional tort causes of action,
such as punitive damages”].
57

Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice in a Changing Profession: The Role of Contract Principles, 61
CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 489, 525 (2013).
58

See Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 410 (2009) [citing a South Carolina case
decided in 1784, which involved “spiking wine,” and stating that “(b)y the middle of the 19th century,
‘punitive damages were undoubtedly an established part of the American common law of torts”].
59

See Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 699 N.W.2d 167, 171 n.4 (Wis. 2005) (“punitive damages … are
sometimes available in tort actions, but generally cannot be had in breach of contract claims”).
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seller who breached the principle of good faith or maliciously damaged the buyer’s
interests.”60 If an American court imposed punitive damages on similar facts, it would do
so not because a breach of contractual obligations warranted such a penalty, but because
the facts that established the breach of contract also proved that the defendant had
committed a tort that is a proper basis for punitive damages.61
Article 113 of the Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China provides that:
A business operator who acts fraudulently in supplying commodities or services is
liable to pay compensation in accordance with the Protection of Consumer Rights and
Interests Law of the People’s Republic of China.62

As explained below in the text, the referenced law on Protection of Consumer Rights
and Interests allows for awards of multiple damages, which can be viewed as a form of
punishment (rather than compensation).
D. Legitimate Reform Versus Power Politics
The standards that now constrain punitive damages awards in the United States reflect
both legitimate debate about principles of public policy and the raw power of interest-group
politics. On the one hand, the constraints are rooted in appropriate concerns about effective
deterrence of anti-social conduct,63 fair notice of penalties,64 proportionality,65 due

60

XU Junke, Who Will Protect Chinese Consumers? The Past, Present and Future of Consumer
Protection Legislation in China, 24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 22, 33 (2011); see also LUI, Tainted Milk Incident,
fn.31 at 411 n. 183 [ translating “The Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on the Relevant Issues
Concerning the Application of Law for Trying Cases on Dispute over Contract for the Sale of Commodity
Houses Article 8 (2003)”].
61

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981) (“Punitive damages are not recoverable for a
breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are
recoverable”).
62

XINQIANG SUN, M.P. ELLINGHAUS, & E.W. WRIGHT, CONTRACT LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC
CHINA WITH JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT 43 (2012).

OF

63

Jill Wieber Lens, Justice Holmes’s Bad Man and the Depleted Purposes of Punitive Damages, 101 KY.
L.J. 789, 790 (2013) (arguing that recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have “depleted both the punishment
and deterrence rationales” of punitive damages).
64

See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1598 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness
enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct
that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose”); Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 525 (2008) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(explaining that “there is a need, grounded in the rule of law itself, to assure that punitive damages are
awarded according to meaningful standards that will provide notice of how harshly certain acts will be
punished”).
65

See Part III-B of this article (discussing the single digit ratio principle derived from constitutional
jurisprudence).
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process,66 and, in some cases, free speech.67 On the other hand, certain punitive damages
limitations are nothing more than the product of effective lobbying by potential
defendants to protect themselves from civil liability to the greatest extent possible.68
Taken as a whole, recent legislative and judicial reforms to American punitive
damages law have been a response to real or potential problems related to the imposition
of punitive awards in tort litigation. Many of those same concerns are likely to be
encountered by Chinese lawyers and judges involved in implementing the punitive
damages provisions of the Chinese Tort Law. Thus, Chinese jurists and scholars may want
to consider whether jurisprudential insights can be gleaned from the American
experience.
E. The Complexity of American Tort Law
Tort law in the United States is exceedingly complex69 because it is a mixture of state
and federal law drawn from statutes, court decisions, and constitutional provisions.
Although all jurisdictions are bound by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution
and certain federal legislative enactments that pre-empt state tort law,70 tort law is usually
66

See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1991) (recognizing that the size of punitive
damages awards is subject to due process limitations).
67
See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (reversing an award of compensatory and punitive
damages in a tort action arising from picketing at a military funeral to protest homosexuality in society and in
the military because “(g)iven that…(the picketers’) speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern,
that speech is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (holding that in cases involving matters of “public concern,” states may not
allow “recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth”); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) [stating in a libel action that “(i)n light of the reduced constitutional value of speech
involving no matters of public concern, the state interest (in redressing defamatory harm) adequately supports
awards of presumed and punitive damages — even absent a showing of ‘actual malice’ (meaning knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth)”].
68
See generally Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 12–13 (2006) (discussing the “dark side” of lobbying in the American legal system).
69
Indeed, the common law principles of American tort law alone are so complex that the current effort to
“restate” them in clear and succinct form has been underway for two decades. See generally Vincent R.
Johnson, The Vast Domain of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 1 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW ONLINE 29–35
(2011), http://wakeforestlawreview.com/the-vast-domain-of-the-restatement-third-of-torts (last visited Nov.
18, 2013) (“Everyday scores of courts in dozens of jurisdictions, hand down tort decisions on a nearly endless
range of issues”).
70
See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992):
Article VI of the (federal) Constitution provides that the laws of the United States “shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” . . . . Thus, since our decision in M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
427, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), it has been settled that state law that conflicts with federal law is “without
effect.” Consideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause “start(s) with the assumption
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formulated at the state level. Therefore, there is considerable variation in the relevant
legal principles. The law on punitive damages differs in important respects among the
fifty states and the District of Columbia, not to mention the U.S. territories, such as
Puerto Rico, 71 American Samoa, 72 Guam, 73 and the Virgin Islands. 74 Consequently,
there are many sources from which potential jurisprudential guidance might arise about
issues related to punitive damages.
While punitive damages are broadly available in some jurisdictions, they are entirely,
or usually, unavailable in other states.75 Professor Anthony J. Sebok has explained that
five American states extensively limit punitive damages:
Louisiana is a Civil Code jurisdiction that refused to recognize punitive damages,
except as statutorily authorized. Nebraska and New Hampshire are common law
jurisdictions that refused to adopt the remedy of punitive damages entirely. Massachusetts
and Washington are common law jurisdictions that do not recognize punitive damages
except as may be covered under specific statutory authorization.76

In the many jurisdictions where punitive damages are recognized under American law,
their availability is constrained by substantive and procedural limitations. It is useful to
focus on two categories of limitations. The first group consists of the state-law constraints
which are typically embodied in statutes. The second group encompasses the federal-law
limitations that arise from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the

that the historic police powers of the States (are) not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Accordingly, “‘(t)he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone’” of pre-emption analysis.
Congress’ intent may be “explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its
structure and purpose.” In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted
if that law actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative
field “as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”
Id. at 516; See also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that a state law tort claim relating to
a manufacturer’s alleged failure to warn of certain risks in administering a drug was not pre-empted even
though the drug’s label had been deemed sufficient by the federal Food and Drug Administration when it
initially approved the manufacturer’s new drug application and later approved changes in the drug’s labeling).
71
See 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 20.2 (2010) [indicating that “(t)he doctrine of
punitive damages is not recognized in Puerto Rico,” but that “moral damages” may be recoverable].
72
See Id. § 20.3(A) (indicating that punitive damages are allowed in American Samoa under limited
circumstances).
73
See Id. § 20.3(B) (discussing the “few cases” in Guam on punitive damages and relevant statutes).
74
See Id. § 20.3(C) (stating that while “there are very few reported cases from the Virgin Islands…it is
clear that punitive damages are recoverable”).
75
See Summary of Punitive Damages Law by State in the U.S., in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW
AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, fn.6 at 311–22.
76
See Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages in the United States, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: COMMON LAW
AND CIVIL LAW PERSPECTIVES, fn.6 at 155.
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United States Constitution.77
II. AMERICAN STATE-LAW LIMITATIONS ON PUNITIVE AWARDS
In many American states, there are statutes or judicial decisions which restrict the
ability of a court to award punitive damages by narrowly defining the types of conduct
that will justify a punitive award, raising the standard of proof, capping the amount of a
punitive award, requiring a portion of a punitive award to be forfeited to the state, or
limiting vicarious liability for punitive damages. These subjects are discussed below.
A. The Egregious-Conduct Requirement
In the United States, it is commonly said that there are four categories of tort liability:
intent,78 recklessness, 79 negligence, 80 and strict liability.81 In the first three of these
categories, liability is based on the fault of the defendant. In the fourth category, the
liability is strict because it is imposed even in the absence of fault.82
Under American law, punitive damages can never be recovered in a case involving
mere negligence.83 Only highly blameworthy conduct justifies a punitive award.84 For
example, the Texas Supreme Court, in Bennett v. Reynolds, found that a punitive award
77

See U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV (providing in part that “No State shall…deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
78
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010)
(discussing intent).
79
See Id. § 2 (discussing recklessness).
80
See Id. § 3 (discussing negligence).
81
See Id. §§ 20–25 (discussing strict liability).
82
Under American law, there are different varieties of strict liability, and some are more strict than others.
See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 649 (5th ed. 2013) [“The ‘strictness’ of strict
liability lies in the fact that one or more of the usual prerequisites for liability based on fault — typically,
proof of unreasonable (or worse) conduct and foreseeability of harm — are dispensed with or modified. As
the requirements for recovery become less numerous or less formidable, the liability becomes more strict”].
83
See e.g. 1 STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 4:11 (3d ed. 1997) (“What is manifestly evident…is
that mere or ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive damages”); See also Safeshred, Inc. v.
Martinez, 365 S.W.3d 655, 662 (Tex. 2012) (“In a typical negligence case like medical malpractice, to
recover exemplary damages a plaintiff must simply prove that the defendant was not merely negligent, but
was grossly negligent or acted intentionally in causing the serious harm that is the subject of the cause of
action”).
84
See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) [stating that the
defendant’s reprehensibility is “(t)he most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award”]; See also Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 903–38
(2004) (“Recovery of money to punish or make an example of the defendant depends not so much upon
whether the action is based on intent or lack of care, but upon whether the case involves highly blameworthy
conduct. Some intentional tort cases satisfy that criterion — others do not. The same is true of suits based on
lack of care”).
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was appropriate where a rancher proved that his neighbor had stolen his cattle.85 As the
court explained, “(t)he jury could have reasonably formed a firm belief…from the theft
itself and from the ongoing hostilities between the parties, that there was nothing
accidental about Bennett’s conduct and that he specifically intended to injure Reynolds by
taking his property.”86
In contrast, in Boring v. Google Inc.,87 the plaintiffs, who lived on a private road,
“discovered that Google had taken ‘colored imagery of their residence, including the
swimming pool, from a vehicle in their residence driveway…without obtaining any
privacy waiver or authorization.’”88 The plaintiffs alleged that their road was clearly
marked “private” and sued on a variety of theories. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action for trespass to land, but
denied punitive damages because they failed to allege conduct that was outrageous or
malicious.
Punitive damages are sometimes recoverable in cases involving intentional injury89
or recklessness, 90 or in cases litigated under a strict liability theory where there is
evidence that the defendant acted in a highly blameworthy fashion.91 However, while
these types of generalities are useful in forming a general understanding of the American
tort system, the applicable provisions of state law are often much more specific.
For example, Wisconsin requires proof that “the defendant acted maliciously toward
the plaintiff or in an intentional disregard of the rights of the plaintiff.”92 South Carolina
frames the standard somewhat more broadly, requiring “wilful, wanton, or reckless
conduct.”93
In Texas, an award of punitive damages requires proof of “(1) fraud; (2) malice; or (3)
85

315 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. 2010).
315 S.W.3d at 872.
87
362 Fed. Appx. 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
88
362 Fed. Appx. at 276.
89
See e.g. Covenant Care, Inc. v. Sup. Ct., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222 (Cal. 2004) (affirming punitive damages
based on multiple torts, including intentional false imprisonment, inflicted by a nursing facility); Haryanto v.
Saeed, 860 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App. 1993) (affirming an award of $2 million in punitive damages, on top of $1
million in compensatory damages, where an aide to a Saudi prince took a hotel employee hostage and
threatened to kill him).
90
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 cmt. b (2010)
(“While a showing of negligence generally suffices for compensatory damages, the standard for awarding
punitive damages commonly refers to the defendant’s reckless conduct — or reckless indifference to risk, or
reckless disregard for risk”).
91
See e.g. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Minn. 1980) [stating, in a case involving
injuries to a child resulting from the defendant’s failure to produce pajamas from flame-proof fabric, that
“(t)here is ample authority from many jurisdictions approving this remedy (punitive damages) in strict
liability cases”].
92
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.043(3) (Westlaw 2013).
93
S.C. CODE 1976 § 15-32-520 (2013).
86
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gross negligence.” 94 The availability of punitive damages in actions for fraud is
particularly important. There is no shortage of misrepresentation in human affairs, and, in
the United States, lawsuits alleging fraud are numerous.95 “Malice” is a term that has
various meanings in American law. For purposes of the Texas punitive damages statute,
“malice” means “a specific intent by the defendant to cause substantial injury or harm to
the claimant.” 96 In Texas, “gross negligence” is roughly equivalent to the level of
wrongdoing which other jurisdictions refer to as recklessness. 97 Thus, “‘[g]ross
negligence’ means an act or omission: (A) which when viewed objectively from the
standpoint of the actor at the time of its occurrence involves an extreme degree of risk,
considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and (B) of
which the actor has actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless
proceeds with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.”98 This
can be a difficult standard to meet. In Diamond Shamrock Refining Co., L.P. v. Hall,99
the Texas Supreme Court held that the plaintiff failed to prove gross negligence because
the evidence did not show that the defendant knew of the risk of a gas compressor
explosion and yet did not exercise care.
Other states have distinguished between recklessness and gross negligence, and do
not treat those levels of culpability as synonymous. For example, Virginia holds that
“wilful recklessness,” and not merely “gross negligence,” is required for punitive
damages. Applying that standard, the Virginia Supreme Court, in Doe v. Issacs,100 held
that a motorist’s behavior in rear-ending a vehicle and leaving the scene of the accident
was not so willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others, and
therefore punitive damages could not be awarded.
Articulating a punitive damages standard that focuses on the state of mind of the
defendant can have unexpected consequences. For example, in Komornik v. Sparks,101 a
94

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (West 2013).
See e.g. Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 418 (2d Cir. 2000) (awarding punitive damages under New
York law against an attorney who committed resume fraud); See also Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M.
Lovorn, Misrepresentation by Lawyers about Credentials or Experience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 534 (2004)
(“Misrepresentation…may support a claim for intentional fraud, and will thus carry with it…the possibility of
punitive damages”); Vincent R. Johnson, Standardized Tests, Erroneous Scores, and Tort Liability, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 655, 692 (2007) (discussing the tort duty to correct false statements).
96
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(7) (Westlaw 2013).
97
A Massachusetts wrongful-death statute treats recklessness and gross negligence the same for purposes
of punitive damages. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Westlaw 2013) (allowing recovery of
“punitive damages in an amount of not less than five thousand dollars in such case as the decedent’s death
was caused by the malicious, willful, wanton or reckless conduct of the defendant or by the gross negligence
of the defendant”).
98
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §41.001(11) (Westlaw 2013).
99
168 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2005).
100
579 S.E.2d 174 (Va. 2003).
101
629 A.2d 721 (Md. 1993).
95
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driver whose blood alcohol level was almost twice the amount required for legal
intoxication caused an accident by depressing the clutch, rather than the brake, as he
approached cars stopped at a traffic light. The Maryland Court of Appeals (the highest
court in that state) held that the defendant’s three prior instances of drunk driving did not
warrant an award of punitive damages because what was needed was evidence of “evil
motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud.” The defendant’s state of mind, the court found,
was to the contrary of what was required, because his “intent was to avoid injury to those
stopped ahead of him.”102
1. Specific U.S. Statutes. — Regardless of the general rules of state law governing
punitive damages, special American statutes often address the availability of punitive
damages in particular contexts. Indeed, in recent years, there has been “a dramatic
increase in the number of statutes pertaining to punitive damages.”103
Many of these legislative enactments are not unlike Article 47 of the Chinese Tort
Law, which, as explained above, indicates that punitive damages are available in certain
cases of harm caused by defective products. Such laws often do little to change the legal
principles that otherwise govern the imposition of punitive damages. They merely
reaffirm that punitive damages are available in particular kinds of cases, such as suits
involving unlawful disclosure of confidential information relating to victims of sexual
assault, 104 injuries caused by perjury, 105 or harm to elderly persons resulting from
deceptive trade practices.106
However, in some instances, special legislation imposes procedural obstacles which
make it difficult to secure a punitive damages award. In California, a person seeking
punitive damages from certain types of health care providers cannot assert a punitive
damages claim without special permission from the court, which is contingent upon
pre-trial showing of a probability of success and subject to various time limitations.107 In
102

629 A.2d at 723–24.
1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 20.0 (2010); see also id. § 20.1 (setting forth extracts
from relevant statutes in the American states and territories).
104
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.1398 (Westlaw 2013).
105
See Id. § 41.365.
106
See Id. § 598.0977.
107
See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.13 (Westlaw 2013), which provides in relevant part that:
In any action for damages arising out of the professional negligence of a health care provider, no
claim for punitive damages shall be included in a complaint…unless the court enters an order
allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages to be filed. The court may
allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive damages…(if) the plaintiff has established
that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim pursuant to Section
3294 of the Civil Code (the general rule governing punitive damages). The court shall not grant a
motion allowing the filing of an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive damages if the
motion for such an order is not filed within two years after the complaint or initial pleading is filed or
not less than nine months before the date the matter is first set for trial, whichever is earlier.
103
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Georgia, punitive damages are unavailable to a defamation plaintiff unless the plaintiff
requested, and was refused, a retraction of the libelous or slanderous statement.108
Some statutes specifically immunize certain defendants from liability for punitive
damages. For example, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United States government
cannot be sued for punitive damages.109 Under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program,110 the manufacturers of vaccines are “immunized from liability for punitive
damages absent failure to comply with regulatory requirements, ‘fraud,’ ‘intentional and
wrongful withholding of information,’ or other ‘criminal or illegal activity.’” 111 A
number of states have enacted legislation barring punitive damages in certain suits against
manufacturers of drugs or devices, if the product complied with federal or state
regulations.112
2. Specific Chinese Statutes. — The Chinese Tort Law is not the only legislation in
China that allows for recovery of what might be called punitive damages. Multiple
damages, which are punitive in effect, are available under the Food Safety Law of the
P.R.C. and the Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law (sometimes called the
Consumer Protection Law113):
Article 96 of the Food Safety Law regulates punitive damages.…(F)irst, the food
producer or seller may incur punitive damages ranging from two times up to ten times the
cost of the food; second, the food producer or seller is subject to punitive damages,
notwithstanding a lack of fraudulent conduct on their behalf. Additionally, Article 96 of the
Food Safety Law provides that if the product does not meet health standards, the consumer
can request ten times compensation, whereas Article 49 of the CRIL (Consumer Rights and
Interests Protection Law) provides that producers and sellers are subject to punitive
damages based upon fraudulent conduct.114

A recent survey found that punitive damages have never been awarded under the
Chinese Food Safety Law. 115 In contrast, awards of punitive damages under the
108

See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-11(c) (Westlaw 2013); see also Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga.
2002) (interpreting state statutes as providing that, because the plaintiff did not request the defendant who
posted a defamatory Internet message to issue a retraction, punitive damages were not recoverable).
109
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, 2674 (Westlaw 2013).
110
42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-10 et seq. (Westlaw 2013).
111
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 (2011).
112
See e.g. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (Westlaw 2013).
113
WANG Weiguo, Fraudulent Conduct and Punitive Damages in The Consumer Protection Law of
China, 4 CANBERRA L. REV. 111, 111 (1997/98) (point stated).
114
See XU, fn.60; See also Benjamin Van Rooij, The People’s Regulation: Citizens and Implementation
of Law in China, 25 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 116, 155 (2012) (describing provisions in the Food Safety Law and
Labor Contract Law as allowing for “quasi-punitive damages”).
115
John Balzano, China’s Food Safety Law: Administrative Innovation and Institutional Design in
Comparative Perspective, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 23, 45 (2012) (“In none of the cases surveyed has
there been an award of punitive damages”).
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Consumer Protection Law, “the first illustration of the adoption of punitive damages in
China’s legislation,”116 can be traced back more than 15 years.117 However, even those
awards are very different from the American concept of punitive damages, as Professor
Chenglin Liu explained in an article about China’s “tainted milk incident”:
Article 49 differs significantly from the concept of punitive damages in the United
States legal system. Article 49 bases the double payment on what the plaintiff paid for
goods or services, not on the compensatory damages caused by the defendant. In the milk
scandal, even if the affected families were allowed to recover double damages under
Article 49, they could only be paid twice the amount they paid for milk powder, not twice
the amount of their actual injuries. Thus, the so-called double damages provision does
very little to punish wrongful conduct. . . .118

3. Culpability Under Article 47. — There is a great need for guidance on matters of
culpability related to the Article 47 of the Chinese Tort Law, the provision which permits
recovery of punitive damages in certain types of products liability cases. Article 47 states
that “(w)here any producer or seller knowingly produces or sells defective products,
causing death or serious damage to the health of others, the injured party may request
appropriate punitive damages.”119
First, as a whole, “(t)he Tort Law fails to define key terms including negligence, gross
negligence, and intentional act.”120 Second, and more specifically, Article 47 fails to
illuminate the key term “knowingly” or even “clarify the type of ‘defect’ that triggers
product liability.”121 Thus, as one writer has commented, “Article 47 provides punitive
damages as a remedy without providing guidance as to the judiciary’s implementation of
such punitive damages awards.”122
“Knowing” that a product is defective is different from “knowing” that it might cause
death or serious bodily injury, whether to the plaintiff in particular or to some unspecified
person in general. It is not clear from the text of Article 47 what the defendant must
“know” in order to be liable for punitive damages under that provision. Of course, this is
116

See WANG, fn.113 at 116; but see Lawrence S. Liu, In the Name of Fair Trade: A Commentary on the
New Competition Law and Policy of Taiwan, The Republic of China, 27 INT’L LAWYER 145, 164 (1993)
[indicating that under Taiwan’s fair trade law, which became effective in 1992, “actual damages may be
trebled,” and noting that “(a)s a form of punitive damages it deviates from the traditional civilian
compensatory (rather than deterrent) rationale for the recovery of damages for civil wrongs”].
117

See WANG, fn.113 at 113 (discussing a case decided in 1996)

118

See LIU, Tainted Milk Incident, fn.31 at 412.

119

See Chinese Tort Law, fn.1 Article 47.

120

See Brandt et al., fn.4 at 490.

121

Id.
See Castellana, fn.31 at 242.

122
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the type of issue that is often pivotal in litigating or deciding a tort case.123
Based on the English translation of Article 47 of the Chinese Tort Law quoted above,
the text of the rule may be read to support the view that all that must be known by the
defendant is that the product was defective, not that the defendant knew that the defective
produce was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury, whether to an unknown person
or to the plaintiff in particular. However, even if that reading of the provision is (as it
appears to be) rooted in the text of Article 47, it is nevertheless a surprising construction.
This is true because such a reading of Article 47 is a more “extreme” view than saying
that punitive damages are appropriate only when the defendant knows both that a product
is defective and that it poses a risk of death or serious bodily injury. An interpretation of
Article 47 that makes a producer or seller liable for punitive damages based only on
knowledge of a product defect would make the Chinese Tort Law’s adoption of punitive
damages an all the more startling departure from the European civil law tradition.
Under American law, “knowledge” is a form of “intent” which means “substantial
certainty,”124 which is to say certainty for all practical purposes that a forbidden result
will occur. Any state of mind which falls short of that exacting standard is not
“knowledge.” An actor who knows that there is a risk, or even a great risk of harm, does
not knowingly (i.e. intentionally) cause harm unless the forbidden result is substantially
certain to follow.125
123

Cf. Richetta v. Stanley Fastening Sys., L.P., 661 F. Supp. 2d 500 (E.D. Pa. 2009). Richetta was a
products liability case that arose from the accidental misfiring of a nail gun. In overturning an award of
punitive damages, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania wrote;
Here, the only basis for Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim is that Defendant had notice of
injuries resulting from its nail guns’ contact trip trigger design, yet Defendant did not redesign its
nail guns to include a safety switch. . . . (A)ssuming that the prior incidents of nail gun misfirings are
similar to the incident in this case, notice of these incidents coupled with Defendant’s decision not to
modify the nail gun’s design are, by themselves, insufficient to show that Defendant had knowledge
of facts that created a high degree of risk of physical harm to another, yet deliberately proceeded to
act in conscious disregard of that risk.
Id. at 514.
124
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010) (“A
person acts with the intent to produce a consequence if: (a) the person acts with the purpose of producing that
consequence; or (b) the person acts knowing that the consequence is substantially certain to result”).
125
To some extent, the difference between knowledge, recklessness, and negligence is a matter of degree.
According to the second Restatement:
If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act,
and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. As the
probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than substantial certainty,
the actor’s conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere recklessness….As the probability
decreases further, and amounts only to a risk that the result will follow, it becomes ordinary
negligence….
RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 8A cmt. b (1965).
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As written, Article 47 raises many unanswered questions: what does “knowingly”
mean?; what is it that must be known?; what is a “product” (as opposed to, for example, a
service)?; what constitutes a product “defect?”; who is a “producer?”; who is a “seller?”;
how are “appropriate” punitive damages measured? These are the types of important
questions that can be answered by thoughtful judicial interpretation.126 Although the
precise legal status of interpretations issued by the Supreme Court of the People’s
Republic of China is in dispute, the issuance of such interpretations is a mechanism
through which Chinese legislation has often be clarified.127
American precedent is relevant to interpretation of Article 47 of the Chinese Tort Law
not because it provides answers to legal questions in China. Rather, it is relevant, first,
because it demonstrates just how important clear answers are to these kinds of questions
and, second, because it provides examples of the ways in which other lawmakers have
struggled to address similar issues.
Scholars have noted the importance of culpability requirements in other areas of
Chinese law. A recent draft of an amendment to the Chinese copyright law provided for
the availability of punitive damages. Not surprisingly, one scholar, noting American
precedent, argued that an award of such damages should be limited to cases involving
“conscious and repeated acts” on the ground that that would provide “breathing space for
persons who . . . (commit) infringement only once or in good faith.”128
B. A Higher Standard of Proof
In American law, there are three well known, but conceptually different, standards of
proof: “preponderance of the evidence,” “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and “clear and
convincing evidence.” The “preponderance of the evidence” standard is broadly applied
to proof of factual issues in civil litigation. It requires the party bearing the burden of
proof (normally the plaintiff, but usually the defendant with respect to affirmative
defenses) to prove that the evidence more likely than not supports that party’s legal
position.129 Thus, in terms of the common visual metaphor, in order for a party to prevail,
it is only necessary for the evidence to tilt the scales of justice slightly in that party’s
126

See Castellana, fn.31, at 242 (“Some commentators predict that standards will be clarified through
judicial interpretation, while others feel that China’s courts may be hesitant to impose punitive damages
without guidelines from the government”).
127
XIAO Yongping & LIANG Wenwen, Property Rights in Intermediated Securities Under Chinese Law,
7 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA 553, 558 (2012) [“Though the formal legal status of judicial interpretation of
the Supreme Court is in dispute, and strictly speaking, the rulings are only intended to serve as guidance for
courts and judges without being strictly binding, (more) often than not, they are read as case law and are used
to resolve issues…”].
128
LIU Wenqi, Reform of China’s Copyright Legislation, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 843, 862 (2012).
129
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “preponderance of the evidence” as “the
greater weight of the evidence…the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may be”).
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favor.
The standard applied by American courts in criminal matters is the “beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.”130 Because the life or liberty of the defendant is often at
stake, all doubts must be resolved against conviction. Only when there is no reasonable
doubt as to the defendant’s guilt will criminal responsibility be imposed. In terms of the
visual metaphor, tilting the scales only slightly against the defendant comes nowhere
close to what the law requires. Rather, the scales must shift so extremely against the
defendant that there is no reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.
Between these two very different standards of proof — the “preponderance of the
evidence” standard and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard — there is an
intermediate view, “clear and convincing evidence.” This third standard of proof requires
more than a probability, but less than the elimination of all reasonable doubts.131 Thus, it
has been said that “the clear and convincing evidence standard does not refer to the
quantity or kind of evidence presented, but to the apparent probability that the assertion is
true: the party with the burden of proof must convince the trier of fact that it is highly
probable that the facts he alleges are correct.”132 In terms of the visual metaphor, the
evidence must tilt the scales of justice clearly and convincingly in favor of the party who
bears the burden of proof.
1. “Clear and Convincing” Evidence. — In the punitive damages realm, thirty-five
American states plus the District of Columbia133 now require a tort plaintiff to prove
entitlement to a punitive award by “clear and convincing evidence.”134 This change in the
usual civil standard of proof — preponderance of the evidence — sometimes determines
the outcome of cases. For example, in Dillard Department Stores, Inc. v. Silva,135 a case
arising from the false imprisonment of a suspected shoplifter, the Texas Supreme Court
reversed an award of punitive damages because there was no clear and convincing
130

Id. (defining “reasonable doubt” by stating “the belief that there is a real possibility that a defendant is
not guilty…‘Beyond a reasonable doubt’ is the standard used by a jury to determine whether a criminal
defendant is guilty”).
131
Id. [defining “evidence” and stating that “clear and convincing evidence…is (e)vidence indicating that
the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain” ].
132
Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a Compromise
Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 462 (2002).
133
See WILSONELSER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES REVIEW 2 (2011) (setting forth a state-by-state table). The
table also indicates that eight states apply a “preponderance of the evidence” standard to proof of punitive
damages, and that one state requires “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The remaining states either do not
permit punitive damages or there is no clear standard.
134
See e.g. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b) (Westlaw 2013) (“The claimant must prove
by clear and convincing evidence the elements of exemplary damages as provided by this section. This
burden of proof may not be shifted to the defendant or satisfied by evidence of ordinary negligence, bad faith,
or a deceptive trade practice”).
135
148 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. 2004).
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evidence of the type of malice required by that state’s punitive damages statute. Thus, the
award of $50,000 in exemplary damages was overturned even though a $13,000 award of
compensatory damages was permitted to stand. (Under the usual principles of American
tort law, entitlement to compensatory damages only needed to be proved by a
“preponderance of the evidence,” which the plaintiff in Silva had produced.)
In many respects, it makes sense to set the standard of proof for punitive damages at
“clear and convincing evidence.” A tort action is a civil suit, so it would be inappropriate
to require the type of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” that is called for in criminal
litigation. However, because a punitive award is intended to punish the defendant, rather
than compensate the plaintiff, something more is required than the lenient
“preponderance of the evidence” standard that applies when the question is whether the
plaintiff is entitled to a purely civil sanction, such as compensatory damages.
2. The Standard of Proof Under Article 47. — Chinese law does not presently recognize
clearly defined standards of proof equivalent to the American standards of
“preponderance of the evidence,” “clear and convincing evidence,” and “proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.” 136 However, there is no reason why such standards would be
136

WU Xiaofeng, An Analysis of Wrongful Convictions in China, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 451, 465
(2011). Discussing criminal law in China, Wu explains:
The Chinese burden of proof is “the facts are clear, the evidence is reliable and sufficient.” This
standard follows the rules of logical induction but not the rules of reasonable doubt. In other words,
as long as the prosecution presents enough evidence of guilt, the fact-finder can conclude that the
defendant is guilty. This standard may sound reasonable and justified; however, because it is a
flexible and nonscientific standard, it may be a dangerous tool for the judge determining a suspect’s
guilt.
One question to consider is how the court construes the words enough, reliable, and sufficient.
Chinese law provides no standard of proof or definition for these words. This flexible or nonexistent
meaning erases the opportunity for the defense attorneys to prove their client’s innocence when
certain evidence may not provide a reasonable doubt of guilt. This standard leaves too much room
for wrongful convictions.
Id. at 465; See also Margaret K. Lewis, Presuming Innocence, or Corruption, in China, 50 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 287, 321 (2012) (indicating that the 2012 Criminal Procedure Law “contains revisions
that are a start at clarifying the burden of proof in criminal cases”). But see GUO Li & Allan V.Y. Ong,
The Fledgling Securities Fraud Litigation in China, 39 HONG KONG L. J. 697 (2009). As GUO & Ong
explain:
The criteria to obtain a finding of liability in criminal cases, civil cases and administrative cases
vary. As of the standards of proof for different litigations, they are the same in principle, namely, “the
facts of a case are clear and the evidence is reliable and sufficient.” This principle has been
interpreted to mean that (a) the evidence has been confirmed to be true, (b) the findings of fact are
supported by sufficient evidence, (c) inconsistencies between different pieces of evidence and
inconsistencies between the evidence and the findings of fact are reasonably eliminated, and (d) there
is only one conclusion and the other possibilities are eliminated. However, the actual standard
employed for criminal cases is “beyond reasonable doubt,” while the standard for civil cases is
“preponderance,” to wit, that the ruling should be in favour of the party that has produced evidence
that is “more forceful.”
Id. at 708.
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incompatible with the proper operation of the Chinese legal system, and some scholars
have urged their application.137 Indeed, the clear articulation of such standards would
seem to be consistent with the continuing development of the Rule of Law in China. “To
comport with the rule of law, legal decision making must be structured in a way that tends
to ensure that results are reliable and that legal principles are applied consistently.”138
Standards of proof must be neither too lenient nor too strict.139
The absence of cases awarding punitive damages under Article 47 may reflect
concerns about the “appropriateness” of levying punitive awards, as that term is used in
the Chinese Tort Law. One way to reduce such concerns, and to realize the utility of
Article 47 as that provision must have been envisioned by the drafters, is to increase
confidence in decisions holding that punitive damages are appropriate. One way to do
that is by insisting that a plaintiff prove entitlement to a punitive award by “clear and
convincing evidence” or some other legal standard that compellingly establishes that
punishment is warranted.
C. Caps on Punitive Damages
In the United States, tort litigation is highly adversarial and decisions about critical
matters — such as whether and in what amount punitive damages should be awarded —
are often made by lay jurors with no special expertise. One serious risk of this
arrangement is that jurors may be enflamed by the effective advocacy of the plaintiff’s
attorney to award an amount of punitive damages that is excessive.140
A few states have responded to this risk by providing that the amount of punitive
damages is to be determined by judges, not juries, either in all cases141 or at least in some
suits.142 Taking a different tack, many states have addressed the risk of excessively large
awards — albeit in crude fashion — by adopting caps on damages. Such caps take many
137

See GUO & Ong, fn.136 at 708–9 (stating that scholars tend to suggest a general standard of clear and
convincing evidence should be applied to administrative liability litigation).
138
Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, The Rule of Law in China and the Prosecution of Li
Zhuang, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 66, 77 (2013).
139
Cf. Jonathan Wike, Note: The Marlboro Man in Asia: U.S. Tobacco and Human Rights, 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 329, 340 (1996) (criticizing the standard of proof for causation in products liability cases in
China as being too strict because “plaintiffs must prove causation to a certainty”).
140
Cf. George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402a Flourished and the Third
Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 851–52 & n.127 (2007) (noting that “where jurors have been
persuaded that Merck willfully failed to disclose important information on its anti-arthritis drug Vioxx, huge
verdicts, including punitive damages, have resulted in Texas and in New Jersey” and citing a case where
“jurors gave a $229 million punitive damages verdict”).
141
See KAN. STAT. Ann § 60-3702 (Westlaw 2013).
142
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (Westlaw 2013) [in products liability actions, “(i)f the trier of
fact determines that punitive damages should be awarded, the court shall determine the amount of such
damages”].
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forms. For example the permissible amount of a punitive award may be limited by
reference to the amount of compensatory damages, the wealth of the defendant, the
financial gain resulting from the tort, or even a fixed dollar figure. For example, in
products liability actions, Connecticut law limits punitive damages to no greater than
twice the amount of the compensatory award.143 Under Colorado law, an award may not
exceed actual damages or, if there are aggravating circumstances, three times actual
damages.144 Alaska has a more complex formula. Punitive damages are limited to the
greater of three times compensatory damages or $500,000, except when action was
motivated by financial gain, in which case punitive damages are limited to the greater of
four times compensatory damages, four times aggregate amount of financial gain, or
$7,000,000.145 Kansas caps punitive damages at no more than $5 million or the gross
income of the defendant, whichever is less.146 Alabama law generally provides that “no
award of punitive damages shall exceed three times the compensatory damages of the
party claiming punitive damages or five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), whichever
is greater,”147 but subject to other exceptions further provides that if “a defendant . . . is a
small business, no award of punitive damages shall exceed fifty thousand dollars
($50,000) or 10 percent of the business’ net worth, whichever is greater.”148
Texas has an unusually detailed capping law. “Exemplary damages awarded against a
defendant may not exceed an amount equal to the greater of: (1) (A) two times the
amount of economic damages; plus (B) an amount equal to any noneconomic damages
found by the jury, not to exceed $750,000; or (2) $200,000.”149 However, with some
exceptions, these caps do not apply to a cause of action against a defendant from whom a
plaintiff seeks recovery of exemplary damages based on conduct described as a felony if
the defendant knowingly or intentionally committed any of the following: murder or
capital murder; aggravated kidnapping or aggravated assault; sexual assault or aggravated
sexual assault; injury to a young, elderly, or disabled person; forgery or commercial
bribery; misapplication of fiduciary property or the property of a financial institution;
securing execution of document by deception; fraudulent destruction, removal, or
concealment of writing; certain forms of theft; intoxication assault or intoxication
manslaughter; or continuous sexual abuse of a young child.150
143

See Id. § 52-240b (“not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded to the plaintiff”).
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102 (Westlaw 2013).
145
See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f)–(h) (Westlaw 2013) (different rules apply to actions involving
employment practices).
146
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(1) (e)–(f) (Westlaw 2013).
147
ALA. CODE § 6-11-21(a) (Westlaw 2013).
148
Id. § 6-11-21(b); Tanner v. Ebbole, 88 So. 3d 856, 880 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that a tattooing
and body piercing parlor was a small business and that therefore damages in a invasion of privacy action were
capped).
149
TEXAS CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.008(b) (Westlaw 2013).
150
Id. § 41.008(c).
144
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In some states, awards of punitive damages are limited in other ways. For example, in
Connecticut:
Punitive damages may not exceed the amount of the expenses of litigation in the suit,
less taxable costs. … However, the expenses of litigation are not limited to attorneys fees.
Litigation expenses may include not only reasonable attorneys fees, but also any other
nontaxable disbursements reasonably necessary to prosecuting the action.151

1. Excessive Punitive Damages Under Article 47. — The Chinese Tort Law contains
no capping provisions to limit the amount of a punitive damages award. Moreover, there
are no other provisions in the law that expressly address the problems posed by the risks
posed by excessive awards of punitive damages. As one commentator has explained:
The Act does not contain…detailed specifications. Neither the criteria for the
establishment of the amount nor the designated limits, nor even the insurability of punitive
damages are detailed.152

It may be that in China, a country without a similar jury trial system,153 the risk of
excessively high awards is considerably less than in the United States.154 However, if
punitive damages awards become common in China, there will be a risk of inconsistent
awards. China has a huge judiciary, and even professional judges can differ in their
assessment of what amount of punitive damages is appropriate. For these and other
reasons, it may be useful to consider the numerous factors reflected in the American
punitive damages capping laws. Even if the American provisions that limit punitive
damages to no more than a set dollar amount or a multiple of compensatory damages are
too arbitrary to be useful in China, those laws also reflect some considerations which may
be relevant in determining what amount of punitive damages is warranted under Chinese
151

Jackson v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 2009 WL 7630238, *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009).

152

Gert Bruggemeier, European Civil Liability Law Outside Europe: The Example of the Big Three:
China, Brazil, Russia, 26 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 99, 105 (2011).
153

ZENG Xun, Enforcing Equal Employment Opportunities in China, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 991,
1023 (2007) (“China has no jury trial system”); John J. Capowski, China’s Evidentiary and Procedural
Reforms, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Harmonization of Civil and Common Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J.
455, 471 (2012) (“As with other civil law systems, China does not have jury trials, and this adds to the power
of the judiciary in that judges do not share fact-finding power with jurors”); see also Stephan Landsman &
ZHANG Jing, A Tale of Two Juries: Lay Participation Comes to Japanese and Chinese Courts, 25 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 179, 180 (2008) [“China’s reformers have sought to…(re-energize) a system of lay assessors with
origins in China’s revolutionary past and a continuing presence in at least some Chinese courts”].
154

David Dai & Alex An, New Tort Liability Law: Ramifications for Companies Doing Business in China,
MWE China Law Offices, http:// www.mwechinalaw.com/news/2010/chinalawalert0110a.htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2013) (“the excessive punitive damages granted by juries in common law countries may not be
repeated in China, because, like most European countries, trial by jury does not exist in the Chinese judicial
system”); see also Castellena, fn.31 at 243 [“most observers do agree that if any punitive damages are
awarded (under the Chinese Tort Law), they will not be excessive”].
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law. As discussed above, those factors include the wealth or income of the defendant, the
possible criminality of the defendant’s conduct, the gain (if any) that the defendant
derived from the tortious conduct, and whether the defendant’s actions specifically
targeted the plaintiff.
D. Forfeiture to the State
It has often been argued that an award of punitive damages can produce a windfall for
a tort plaintiff who will already be fully compensated for resulting losses by an award of
compensatory damages.155 The merits of this argument can be questioned, at least in the
United States. In America, successful plaintiffs are generally not reimbursed for
attorney’s fees incurred in litigating the tort action.156 Attorneys representing plaintiffs in
tort litigation often work on a contingent fee basis and are paid perhaps 35% or 40% of
the amount recovered by the plaintiff as a result of a judgment or settlement.157 Once this
practice is taken into account, it is clear that compensatory damages rarely compensate
the plaintiff fully because the amount received by the plaintiff is reduced by substantial
attorney’s fees and, in the usual case, the expenses of litigation (e.g. filing fees and
discovery costs), which are typically contingently advanced by the plaintiff’s attorney
while the case is pending. Thus, an additional award of punitive damages often simply
helps to ensure that a plaintiff obtains full compensation. Of course, if the punitive award
is large or the attorney’s fees owed by the plaintiff are small, the plaintiff might be
overcompensated, if all relevant factors are taken into account.
In an effort to address concerns about windfall recoveries and increase state revenues,
some American jurisdictions have enacted laws which require a portion of a punitive
damages award to be forfeited to the state. In Illinois,158 the amount of the forfeiture is
left to the discretion of the court. In other states, the amount of the forfeiture is calculated
as a percentage of the punitive award. For example, in Missouri, with certain limitations

155

See e.g. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (“It should be
presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages
should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after having paid compensatory damages, is so
reprehensible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence”).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 (2003)
156
See James Maxeiner, The American “Rule”: Assuring the Lion His Share, 11 IUS GENTIUM 287, 288
(2012) (“the practice in America is that each party pays his own lawyer her fee. Consequently losers do not
make winners whole through paying their attorneys’ fees”).
157
Jeffrey D. Swett, Determining a Reasonable Percentage in Establishing a Contingency Fee: A New
Tool to Remedy and Old Problem, 77 TENN. L. REV. 653, 656 (2010) [“even when the (contingent fee)
percentage varies, it is seldom less than the standard 33%”]; see also Vincent R. Johnson, Tort Law in
America at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 1 RENMIN U. L. REV. 237, 254–7 (2000) (discussing the role of
contingent fees in the American tort system).
158
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (Westlaw 2013).
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and exceptions, the state is entitled to 50%,159 and in Oregon the state gets 75%.160 In
Georgia, a law applicable to products liability actions requires forfeiture to the state of
75% of a punitive damages award (less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation).161
Some forfeiture laws are inapplicable if there are special facts. Thus, under Iowa law,
the usual 75% forfeiture rule does not apply if the defendant’s conduct was directed
specifically at the plaintiff.162
The forfeited portion of a punitive damages award may simply become part of the
general revenues of the state. However, in some jurisdictions, the forfeited amount is
designated for use as part of a special state fund, such as a Criminal Injuries
Compensation Account or State Court Facilities and Security Account. 163 In
Pennsylvania, if punitive damages are awarded in a case involving violation of the Fine
Arts Protection Act (which encompasses certain types of physical defacement, mutilation,
alteration, or destruction of a work of fine art), “the court shall, in its discretion, select an
organization or organizations engaged in charitable or educational activities involving the
fine arts … to receive such damages.”164
Punitive damages forfeiture laws have produced less revenue that might be expected.
This is due to two realities. First, large punitive damages awards are often reversed or
reduced on appeal. Second, most tort cases are resolved by settlement, rather than by a
court judgment. Some forfeiture laws expressly exempt settlements from their
coverage.165 In other instances, settlements are a private matter. Moreover, when a claim
is settled, there is typically no clear delineation of compensatory and punitive amounts.
Thus, there is often no practical way to apply forfeiture provisions to settlements.
1. Split Recovery Under Article 47. — Article 47 of the Chinese Tort Law states in
relevant part that “the injured party may request appropriate punitive damages.” The clear
implication seems to be that the entire award of punitive damages will go to the plaintiff.
However, if there is a concern in China that punitive damages awards will
overcompensate plaintiffs for their losses, it would be possible to consider whether a
portion of such an award should be forfeited to the state. In considering the wisdom of
that legal step, it may be useful to consider both the structure and the record in practice of
the forfeiture provisions that have been enacted in the United States.
159

See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.675(3) (Westlaw 2013) (discussing the state’s lien).
See OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (Westlaw 2013) (forfeiture of 70%).
161
See GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Westlaw 2013)
162
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (Westlaw 2013).
163
See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.735(1) (b) & (c) (Westlaw 2013) (discussing allocations).
164
73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2105(3) (Westlaw 2013).
165
See e.g. MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (Westlaw 2013) (“Cases resolved by arbitration, mediation or
compromise settlement prior to a punitive damage final judgment are exempt from the provisions of this
section”).
160
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E. Limits on Employer Vicarious Liability
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that punitive damages may be assessed against an
employer under principles of vicarious liability without violating the Due Process
requirements of the federal Constitution.166 As the Court explained:
Imposing exemplary damages on the corporation when its agent commits intentional
fraud creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those in a position “to guard substantially
against the evil to be prevented.”…If an insurer were liable for such damages only upon
proof that it was at fault independently, it would have an incentive to minimize oversight of
its agents. Imposing liability without independent fault deters fraud more than a less
stringent rule. It therefore rationally advances the State’s goal.167

However, some states have enacted statutes that limited the occasions when vicarious
liability for punitive damages may be imposed. For example, under Alaska law:
In a civil action in which an employer is determined to be vicariously liable for the act
or omission of an employee, punitive damages may not be awarded against the employer
under principles of vicarious liability unless
(1) the employer or the employer’s managerial agent (A) authorized the act or
omission and the manner in which the act was performed or omission occurred; or (B)
ratified or approved the act or omission after the act or omission occurred; or
(2) the employee (A) was unfit to perform the act or avoid the omission and the
employer or the employer’s managerial agent acted recklessly in employing or retaining
the employee; or (B) was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting within the
scope of employment.
In this subsection, “managerial agent” means a management level employee with the
stature and authority to exercise control, discretion, and independent judgment over a
certain area of the employer’s business and with some power to set policy for the
employer.168

Taking a different approach focused specifically on whether employers can be
vicariously liable for punitive damages based on criminal conduct of employees, Texas
law provides that:
In an action arising out of a criminal act committed by an employee, the employer may
be liable for punitive damages but only if:
(1) the principal authorized the doing and the manner of the act;
(2) the agent was unfit and the principal acted with malice in employing or retaining
166
167
168

See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
499 U.S. at 14.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(k) (Westlaw 2013).
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him;
(3) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of
employment; or
(4) the employer or a manager of the employer ratified or approved the act.169

The Alaska and Texas provisions each narrow the usual scope of liability of
employers for punitive damages related to their business activities. Basic principles of
vicarious liability broadly hold American employers liable for damages caused by the
tortious conduct of employees within the scope of employment,170 even when such
conduct is prohibited by the employer171 or might be characterized as criminal.172
1. Vicarious Liability Under Article 47. — The punitive damages provision in the
Chinese Tort Law appears to focus on enterprise liability, rather than individual liability.
The relevant language in Article 47 states that “(w)here any producer or seller knowingly
produces or sells defective products, causing death or serious damage to the health of
others, the injured party may request appropriate punitive damages.”173 The provision
thus seems to imply that the producer or seller, rather the producer or seller’s constituent
representatives (e.g. officers, director, employees, and agents), will be liable for the
payment of the punitive award.

Nevertheless, in some cases, it may be useful to consider carefully the question of
whether the conduct of employees or other representatives of an employer should be
imputed to an employer for the purpose of imposing punitive damages. For example, does
the fact that a lower level employee knew that a product was defective necessarily mean
that the employer or producer knew about the defect? In considering such questions and
determining how Chinese law should be interpreted or reformed, it may be useful to
consider the American statutes which have altered the usual rules of vicarious liability
and whether those modifications comport with the policies that support the imposition of
169

TEX. CIV. PRAC. AND REM. CODE § 41.005(c) (Westlaw 2013).
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See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (“An employer is subject to liability for torts
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment”); Id. § 7.07(2) (“An employee
acts within the scope of employment when performing work assigned by the employer or engaging in a
course of conduct subject to the employer’s control. An employee’s act is not within the scope of employment
when it occurs within an independent course of conduct not intended by the employee to serve any purpose of
the employer”).
171

See e.g. Smith v. Lannert, 429 S.W.2d 8, 15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968) (“Bettendorf-Rapp may be held
responsible for the assault committed by Lannert even though Lannert acted wantonly and contrary to
Bettendorf-Rapp’s instructions…provided there is proof the assault was made with intent to promote or
further the master’s business”).
172

See Privacy and Publicity, 19 BUS. TORTS REP. 154, 155 (2007) (“vicarious liability extends to acts
that are negligent, willful, malicious, and even criminal, if committed within the scope of employment”).
173
See Chinese Tort Law, fn.1 Article 47.
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punitive awards.
III. AMERICAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON PUNITIVE AWARDS
The most amazing change in the field of American punitive damages law since the
early-1990s has been the rise of federal constitutional restrictions on such awards. Until
that time, the United States Supreme Court consistently rejected the idea that the power of
states to award punitive damages was limited in any way by the federal constitution.
However, in series of decisions during the past two decades, the Court has made clear that
punitive awards are indeed subject to Due Process constraints imposed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, America has gone from a system where state
awards of punitive damages could never successfully be challenged on federal
constitutional grounds to one where such claims are potentially viable and therefore
virtually every substantial punitive award is subject to attack under the federal
constitution.
Federal constitutional restrictions on punitive damages will be considered below. In
addition, it is important to remember that non-constitutional aspects of federal law can
limit the availability of punitive damages under state law. For example, the federal Paul D.
Coverdell Teacher Protection Act provides that:
Punitive damages may not be awarded against a teacher in an action brought for harm
based on the act or omission of a teacher acting within the scope of the teacher’s
employment or responsibilities to a school or governmental entity unless the claimant
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the harm was proximately caused by an
act or omission of such teacher that constitutes willful or criminal misconduct, or a
conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed.174

However, the Coverdell Act further provides that:
Paragraph (1) (quoted above) does not create a cause of action for punitive damages
and does not preempt or supersede any Federal or State law to the extent that such law
would further limit the award of punitive damages.175

Thus, the federal Teacher Protection Act restricts, but in no way increases, the
availability of punitive damages in certain state tort actions.
A. Constitutional Landmarks
Applicable provisions of state law often articulate the factors that may be taken into
account in awarding punitive damages. For example, a Texas statute provides that:
(a) In determining the amount of exemplary damages, the trier of fact shall consider
evidence, if any, relating to: (1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct
174
175

20 U.S.C.A. § 6736(c)(1) (Westlaw 2013).
20 U.S.C.A. § 6736(c)(2) (Westlaw 2013).
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involved; (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and sensibilities
of the parties concerned; (5) the extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of
justice and propriety; and (6) the net worth of the defendant.176

However, any such list of relevant factors must be consistent with federal
constitutional principles.
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,177 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a $2
million punitive damages award to a car purchaser who suffered only $4,000 in
compensatory damages as a result of the undisclosed predelivery damage to a vehicle he
had purchased. The Court found that the award violated constitutional principles because
it was “grossly excessive.” In reaching that conclusion, the court articulated language
which has since formed the bedrock of federal constitutional restrictions on punitive
damages awards. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the court:
Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate
that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment,
but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose. Three guideposts, each of
which indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction
that Alabama might impose … , lead us to the conclusion that the $2 million award against
BMW is grossly excessive: the degree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity
between the harm or potential harm suffered by Dr. Gore and his punitive damages award;
and the difference between this remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.178

The three guideposts of the Gore decision have become famous landmarks in
American law and are referred to by virtually every case challenging an award of punitive
damages on federal constitutional grounds. However, there is another American decision
on punitive damages that is even more famous, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell.179
In Campbell, a large punitive award was based on evidence that for over twenty years,
both in Utah and in other states, an insurance company had adhered to practices that were
calculated to underpay legitimate claims. The Supreme Court reviewed the punitive
damage award in light of the factors previously set down in Gore, and held that the
amount violated the Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s
opinion offers substantial guidance as to what factors may be taken into account by
American courts in imposing punitive damages. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for a

176
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TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.011 (Westlaw 2013).
517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
517 U.S. at 574–5.
538 U.S. 408 (2003).
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majority of the justices:
A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been lawful where it
occurred. … Nor, as a general rule, does a State have a legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State’s
jurisdiction. … Lawful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates the
deliberateness and culpability of the defendant’s action in the State where it is tortious, but
that conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. … A
defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent from the acts upon which liability was premised,
may not serve as the basis for punitive damages. A defendant should be punished for the
conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an unsavory individual or business. Due
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the
merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under the guise of the
reprehensibility analysis….Punishment on these bases creates the possibility of multiple
punitive damages awards for the same conduct…..Although…a recidivist may be punished
more severely than a first offender…in the context of civil actions courts must ensure the
conduct in question replicates the prior transgressions….(F)ew awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process….Nonetheless, because there are no rigid benchmarks that a
punitive damages award may not surpass, ratios greater than those we have previously
upheld may comport with due process where ‘a particularly egregious act has resulted in
only a small amount of economic damages.’…The converse is also true, however. When
compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to
compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.180

The Campbell decision is the most important landmark in the American law of
punitive damages. As constitutional precedent, it has many consequences. Campbell
means, for example, that while general deterrence may be a goal of the law in imposing
punitive damages, “in fixing the amount of a punitive damages award, a jury only may
aim for deterrence of the specific defendant.”181
Some of the lessons of Gore and Campbell have little relevance to China. This is true
because China has a single tort system with unified principles that apply across the nation,
rather than differ from province to province.
However, two of the lessons of Gore and Campbell may be instructive to lawyers,
scholars, and jurists in China. Those lessons relate to what is now widely called “the
single-digit ratio principle” and to the significance of actual or potential harm to persons
other than the plaintiff.

180
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538 U.S. at 421–5.
Tarr v. Bob Ciasulli’s Mack Auto Mall, Inc., 943 A.2d 866, 868 (N.J. 2008) (emphasis added).
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B. The Single-Digit Ratio
There is no language in the Fourteenth Amendment, or elsewhere in the federal
Constitution, that specifically articulates a single-digit ratio principle applicable to the
review of punitive damages awards. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s statement in
Campbell that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process”182 has had a
transformative effect on American law. In every case, lawyers and judges are forced to
think about the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages. While not every
award where there is a single digit on each side of the ratio symbol (e.g. 1:1, 1:5, or 1:9)
will survive a constitutional challenge, an award where there is more than a single digit
on one side of the ratio symbol (e.g. 1:10, 1:100, or 1:500) is likely to be found
constitutionally infirm.
The single-digit principle has clarified American thinking about punitive damages in a
way that the often-complex state punitive damage capping laws, discussed above,183
rarely have. The principle has greatly tamed the risk of excessive punitive damages
awards.
Notwithstanding the single-digit ratio limitation, some very substantial awards have
survived constitutional challenges. For example, in McDonald’s v. Ogborn, a Kentucky
court upheld a $5 million punitive award against a McDonald’s restaurant because there
was evidence that, over a period of ten years, corporate management had made a
conscious decision not to train or warn store managers or employees about hoax phone
calls that were part of a scheme where, on more than thirty occasions, a person pretending
to be a police officer “convinced restaurant managers, employees, and third parties to
conduct strip searches and even sexual assaults at his direction.”184
Moreover, mindful of the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that there is no
hard-and-fast constitutional rule, some American courts have upheld as comporting with
due process awards that have exceeded the recommended single-digit ratio. Thus, in T.P. v.
Weiss,185 the Ohio Court of Appeals approved a punitive award in a sexual assault case
that was twenty times greater than the compensatory damages award.
However, in general, American courts have hewed closely to the single-digital ratio
principle. For example, in Nickerson v. Stonebridge Life Insurance Company,186 a case
arising from fraudulent conduct by an insurance company, the California Court of Appeal
182
183
184
185
186

538 U.S. at 425.
See Part II-C.
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reduced the punitive damages award from $19 million to just $350,000 to preserve a 10:1
punitive-to-compensatory damages ratio.
Less clear than Campbell’s single-digit ratio principle was the Supreme Court’s
announcement in that case that “(w)hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a
lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit
of the due process guarantee.”187 There is little clarity in American law as to when a
compensatory damages award is “substantial” for purposes of triggering this additional
constitutional limitation.188
For example, in Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,189 the California Court of Appeal
considered the appeal by a tobacco company of a judgment awarding the surviving
daughter of a man who had died of lung cancer $850,000 in compensatory damages and
$13.8 million in punitive damages. The defendant company argued that “there is an
emerging consensus that ‘six-figure damage awards are more than “substantial” enough
to trigger…(the) 1:1 upper limit (mentioned in Campbell).’”190 Rejecting that argument,
the California Court of Appeal approved an award with a 16:1 ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, stating:
We cannot discern any emerging consensus in this regard relevant to the extremely
reprehensible conduct at issue in this case. Moreover, we do not regard the amount of
compensatory damages as a fixed upper limit where damages are “substantial….Instead,
the constitutional limit depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.”191

1. Ratios under Article 47. — The text of the Chinese Tort Law “provides no
guidelines” for the calculation of punitive damages. 192 Nevertheless, such guidance
might be provided means of an official interpretation of Article 47 and in particular the
language authorizing “appropriate” punitive damages. Presumably, such guidance could
address the relevance of the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.
In the United States, the federal Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and state

187

538 U.S. at 425.
After Campbell was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court considered Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554
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law provisions that run afoul of Constitutional dictates can be invalidated as
“unconstitutional.”193 However, the Chinese constitution does not play a similar role in
the Chinese litigation.194 Therefore, any effort to articulate a single-digit ratio principle,
or some similar limitation, would need to be rooted in other jurisprudence. Presumably
that would not be difficult. By its entry into the WTO, China has committed itself to the
pursuit of the Rule of Law.195 There are many authorities that say that the Rule of Law
entails a commitment to fair procedures, including notice, due process, and
proportionality.
C. Actual or Potential Harm to Other Persons
In the landmark Campbell decision, discussed above,196 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that an award of punitive damages cannot be based on hypothetical claims by third
persons.197 More specifically, the Court stated that the “precise award in any case…must
be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s conduct and the harm to the
plaintiff.”198
Subsequent to Campbell, the Supreme Court made emphatically clear that an award of
punitive damages may not be based, even in part, on the factfinder’s desire to punish a
defendant for harming nonparties. In Philip Morris USA v. Williams,199 the jury had
made a large punitive damages award to the estate of a heavy smoker after the plaintiff
urged the jury to consider how many other smokers had been killed by the defendant’s
cigarettes. In remanding the case to the Oregon Supreme Court for further proceedings,
Justice Stephen Breyer’s opinion for the court explained:
(T)he (federal) Constitution’s Due Process Clause forbids a State to use a punitive
damages award to punish a defendant for injury that it inflicts upon nonparties or those
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whom they directly represent, i.e…. essentially, strangers to the litigation. For one thing,
the Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first
providing that individual with “an opportunity to present every available defense.”…Yet a
defendant threatened with punishment for injuring a nonparty victim has no opportunity to
defend against the charge, by showing, for example in a case such as this, that the other
victim was not entitled to damages because he or she knew that smoking was dangerous or
did not rely upon the defendant’s statements to the contrary.
For another, to permit punishment for injuring a nonparty victim would add a near
standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation. How many such victims are
there? How seriously were they injured? Under what circumstances did injury occur? The
trial will not likely answer such questions as to nonparty victims. The jury will be left to
speculate….
…
Respondent argues that she is free to show harm to other victims because it is relevant
to a different part of the punitive damages constitutional equation, namely,
reprehensibility. That is to say, harm to others shows more reprehensible conduct. Philip
Morris, in turn, does not deny that a plaintiff may show harm to others in order to
demonstrate reprehensibility. Nor do we….Yet…a jury may not go further than this and
use a punitive damages verdict to punish a defendant directly on account of harms it is
alleged to have visited on nonparties.
…(I)t is particularly important that States avoid procedure that unnecessarily deprives
juries of proper legal guidance. We therefore conclude that the Due Process Clause
requires States to provide assurance that juries are not asking the wrong question, i.e.
seeking, not simply to determine reprehensibility, but also to punish.200

1. The Focus of Harm Under Article 47. — Jurists charged with applying Article 47 of
the Chinese Tort Law, which allows awards of punitive damages in products liability
cases, are sure to confront issues about whether a plaintiff can recover punitive damages
based only on harm suffered by the plaintiff, or whether the award can reflect actual or
potential harm to third persons. The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell
and Philip Morris offer some guidance about how American courts have struggled to
address similar issues.
When a product, such as tainted milk,201 injures many consumers, there is a risk that
a defendant may be exposed to multiple awards of punitive damages in separate tort
actions. The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court — which hold that a plaintiff may
recover punitive damages based only on harm to the plaintiff, not based on harm to others
or hypothetical harm — offer an example of one approach that reduces the risk of
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duplicative punitive damages awards, and consequently the risk of excessive punishment.
CONCLUSION
The value of comparative law is not that the legal experience of one country supplies
definitive answers to legal questions in another country. Rather, it is that the experience of
one country can illuminate the legal issues and resulting choices that another country is
likely to face.
China is now engaged in the daunting task of building a new legal system that is equal
to the demands of both the Rule of Law and the realities of modern life. In addressing this
great challenge, it is entirely appropriate for Chinese scholars and jurists to consider with
an open mind and critical eye the legal experience of other countries. Doing so is
consistent with the best traditions of modern Chinese law making. As Dean Wenhua Shan
has remarked, even as “the Chinese legal system is itself beginning to influence
developments around the world,” it is still true that the “contemporary Chinese legal
system is essentially an outcome of the functioning of comparative law and will remain
so in the years to come.”202
During the past two decades, American lawmakers have devoted a great amount of
time and effort to reforming the law of punitive damages. At the state level, statutes and
judicial decisions have redefined the types of conduct that will justify punitive awards,
raised the standard of proof, capped the amounts of punitive awards, required that
punitive awards be shared with the state, and limited vicarious liability for punitive
damages. In addition, as a result of federal constitutional developments, there is a new
focus on ensuring that punitive awards bear an appropriate relationship to compensatory
damages and are firmly rooted in the harm suffered by the plaintiff, rather than
speculation about harm to nonparties or hypothetical injuries.
Many (but certainly not all) of the recent American reforms have been wise. An
examination of these developments may prove useful to those charged with the task of
implementing Article 47 of the Chinese Tort Law. Given the complexity and abundance
of American tort law, there is an almost endless trove of source materials.
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